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Abstract
The paper tries to find out the impact of trade liberalization on income inequality. The literature 
suggests that trade favors one segment of the society over other and cause uneven development. For 
example, one possible way through which inequality is suspected to seep into the economy through 
processes of liberalization is by increasing the relative wages of skilled labor as compared to the 
unskilled ones. Empirical evidence is provided to this effect by employing Theil Wage inequality Index 
and up to 28 different concepts of openness/ trade policy. OLS as well as 2SLS regressions with 
numerous specifications were run.  It is found out that openness not only causes wage inequality but 
the relationship is significant for the developing countries. Additionally, the study also suggests that 
human capital, which is accrued from liberalization processes, is responsible for amplifying wage 
inequality. 
“Openness and trade liberalization are now seen almost universally as key components of the national 
policy cocktail required for economic growth and aggregate economic well being. They are believed to 
have been central to the remarkable growth of industrial  countries since the mid- 20th century and to 
the examples of successful economic development since around 1970. The continued existence of 
widespread and abject poverty, on the other hand, represents perhaps the greatest failure of the 
contemporary global economy and the greatest challenge it faces as we enter the 21st 
century.”………..Alan Winters (2000).
“Comprehensive trade reform can be helpful in reducing poverty provided it is accompanied by 
appropriate enabling policies.”………..Global Poverty report (World Bank, 2001a)
1. Introduction:
Many studies have tried to capture the relationship between trade liberalization and 
income inequality. A recent paper by the two well known World Bank economists, 
Dollar and Kraay (2004), concludes that liberalization does not carry any significant 
effects on income distribution and at best the relationship is of neutral nature. 
However their results have been challenged by many on the basis of their 
methodology and variable choice (i.e., see Ravallion, 2003; Amann et al, 2002; 
* The author is grateful to Mansoob Murshed (ISS) for his comments and Andrew K Rose (UCL, 
Berkeley) and Francesco Trebbi (Harvard University) for sharing their data. 
2Srinivasam and Bhagwati, 2002). Murshed (2003) pointed out that Dollar and Kraay 
only considered successful globalizers, mainly from Asia, in their analysis and 
excluded the unsuccessful globalizers from their sample in order to capture trade 
and poverty relationships. 
 Furthermore there is ample empirical evidence in the literature which rejects the 
notion that trade is insignificantly related with inequality.  For example, Behrman et 
al (2001) noticed that in 7 out of 18 Latin American countries that initiated market 
reforms in the mid 1980s, inequality has actually increased in recent times. The rest 
of the economies in their sample showed that inequality was approximately same in 
1990s to the levels of 1980s. Jayasuriya (2002), though accepted that liberalization 
has reduced consumption poverty in South Asia, showed skepticism concerning 
neutral distributional effects of liberalization. A more clear line is adopted by single 
country case studies. Many suggest that the distribution of the positive effects of 
liberalization is some what skewed towards urban households rather than rural and 
wealthy households rather than poor.1 It is further noticed in many studies2 that 
liberalization process in many developing countries seems to be biased against low-
skilled labor. The empirical verification in this regard comes mainly from Latin 
American region primarily because most of the economies in the region undertook 
rigorous reform policies in the mid 1980s as part of their structural adjustment plans 
and also witnessed grappling inequality in Post reform periods. Ligovini et al (2001) 
found out that inequality in Mexico rose sharply between 1984 and 1994 and rising 
returns to skill labor accounted for 20 percent of the increase in the inequality in 
household per capita income. Similarly, Hanson and Harrison (1999) found that the 
reduction in tariffs and the elimination in import licenses account for 23 percent 
increase in the relative wages of skilled labor over the period of 1986-1990 thus 
providing evidence for the role liberalization played in rising inequality in Mexico. 
Other country studies on Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Venezuela, also show that 
skilled workers received increased premiums after liberalization when compared to 
their unskilled counterparts (World Bank, 2001b). Such empirical evidence 
1 See for example, Chen and Ravallion (2003), Cockburn (2001), Friedman(2000), Lofgren (1999). 
2 i.e., Behrman et al (2001). 
3contradicts the basic trade theory which suggests that trade liberalization would 
result in an increase in demand for low-skilled in a developing country, thereby 
improving the relative earnings of this group compared with the more skilled. The 
evidence further feeds the fears of Ravallion (2003) that openness to trade can lead 
to the demand for relatively skilled labor, which tends to be more inequitably 
distributed in poor countries than rich ones. He  also proposed caution regarding the 
results of David and Dollar (2004) paper concerning neutral inequality effects of 
trade reform on the base of latter’s methodology and referred to his own empirical 
work which found that reform process do carry unequal distributional effects.
2.  Trade Liberalisation and Movements in Relative Wages: 
We employ the UTIP-UNIDO wage inequality ‘THEIL’ measure calculated by 
University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP), instead of taking measures of absolute 
inequality which captures the personal income distribution i.e. GINI. This is because 
we are more interested in the functional distribution of income. Changes in the 
functional distribution between skilled and unskilled labour, will in turn predictably 
impact on the personal income distribution in countries that are unskilled labour 
abundant. Inequality will rise as the skilled-unskilled labour wage premium increases 
and vice versa. Since, the Theil Index is based on UNIDO 2001, the wages of skilled 
and unskilled labor represent sectoral wage rates, including manufacturing industries 
for which the UNIDO Industrial Statistics Database (UISDB) provides detailed time-
series data for most countries in the world.
The basic formula of Theil index is as follows.
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4Whereas under perfect equality, i.e. everybody gets the mean income, the index 
takes the value equal to zero:
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However in the case of perfect inequality, one person takes all and everyone else 
gets nothing. The individuals can be ordered in the sum from i=1,...,n from lowest to 
highest income.
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The value of Theil index depends upon the size of the population, as in (3). For 
example, consider a society with two people where one person has everything and 
compare it to a society with four people where one person has everything, also. 
Which society is more unequal? There are more poor persons per rich person in the 
society of four people, so the Theil index will be greater in that case. The UTIP 
dataset provides the Theil index for nearly 160 developing and developed countries, 
and the time series spans 40 years, from the early 1960s to the late 1990s. 
Figure 1 illustrates trends in wage inequality over time in selected developing 
countries and is representative of different regions. All the country graphs, except 
one, show that wage inequality has been on the rise in 1980s and 1990s. The only 
exception is Singapore which belongs to group associated with the “East Asian 
Miracle” of the 1980s. This miracle, however, is confined to a few countries, and is 
not representative of the developing world, as is evident from above graphs. Since 
1980s and 1990s are associated with ‘Structural Adjustment Policies’ under which 
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many developing countries embraced liberalization, it is safe to imply that the above 
trends in wage inequality is related to these market reforms. 
Figure 1:
Colombia
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6The object of this paper is to see whether this proposition holds across some 124 
developing countries and economies in transition. Appendix 3 lists these countries, 
and the latest year for which the Theil wage inequality index was available for them. 
To this effect the paper initially proposes a simple OLS regression model:
………………………..(4)iiiii DisteqHKOPENTHEIL  
Where  is wage inequality in country i, and are respectively iTHEIL iOPEN iHK
measures for openness/trade policy and human capital and  is the random error i
term, whereas  (distance from the equator) is a proxy for geography. iDisteq
Inclusion of human capital and geography variables will enhance the explanatory 
power of our model because on the one hand human capital plays important role in 
inequality in a post liberalization period since international trade favors skilled labor 
over unskilled and on the other hand country locations determine patterns of trade 
subsequently affecting inequality. 
Figure 2
 
 
       Openness (Exports+Imports/GDP, 1985) , Tariffs (Import Duties as a % Imports, 1985) and Wage Inequality (Theil Index, 1997)
Before undertaking any regression analysis, let us take a look at simple graphs (figure 
2) showing bi-variate relationship between openness and inequality. The first graph 
in the figure shows that trade shares are positively related with increases in 
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7inequality and confirms our hypothesis that international trade is biased towards the 
wages of skilled labor in developing countries. However interestingly, the second 
graph in figure 2 fails to develop any definite association between tariffs3 and 
inequality substantiates the findings of Dollar and Kraay (2004) that the relationship 
between integration and inequality is at best insignificant. Well the lesson which can 
be drawn from figure 2 is that the choice of openness/trade policy variable matters 
apropos its relation with inequality. This calls for a robustness check.
To this effect the OLS regression analysis (Appendix 1) utilizes several concepts of 
openness and trade policy in addition to trade shares and tariff rates. Here a study 
by Rose (2004) has been of great use because his paper identifies nearly 60 different 
measures of openness/trade policy. 28 of these measures, which suit the data 
requirements, are employed in this paper (Please refer to Appendix 2 which gives 
detailed information about these measures). Nevertheless our core openness 
variable remains to be overall trade share (the ratio of nominal imports plus exports 
to GDP). 
As far as the signs of the coefficients of 28 openness/trade policy variables are 
concerned, Tables 1a and 1b show that they have been overwhelmingly positive 
under all specifications satisfying the assertion that openness is positively associated 
with increased wage inequality. However the coefficients have very small values 
suggesting limited role they play in explaining inequality. Small values with any of 2R
the specifications of Eq (4) suggest the same. Additionally only 7 out of 28 
openess/trade policy concepts have turned out to be significant which suggest that 
the relationship between trade and inequality is weak in nature. In the light of these 
results we cannot confidently claim that openness cause increased relative wage 
inequality by favoring skilled labor. 
The OLS regression though useful is always suspected to suffer from econometric 
problems such as endogeneity among variables especially under cross section 
3 Movement in tariffs captures country’s trade policy and also shows its level of openness.
8analysis. Though Geography is a pure exogenous variable here, the level of 
integration of an economy depends upon its location in the world map (Rodrik et al, 
2004). Similarly, human capital depends on the fact how open a country is. Though 
simple Stolper-Samuelson theory would suggest that the returns to skill would 
decline and with them incentives for education when a skilled-scarce developing 
country opens up (see Wood and Ridao-Cano, 1999), in a multidimensional Stolper 
Simuelson model which is nearer to real life, endogenous growth with constant 
returns to R & D or skills-bias in tradables as oppose to non tradables could very well 
lead to increase in returns to education upon openness (Arbache et al, 2004). 
Openness can also lead to more efficient education technologies thus improving the 
level of human capital in a country (Winters, 2004). Here we have to extract the 
dependency of trade policy/openness on human capital by finding a right instrument 
for the former variable. 
The literature clearly establishes that predicted trade shares following Frankel and 
Romer (FR) (1999) from the gravity equation is the most appropriate instrument for 
openness/ trade policy ( see, Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004; Acemolgu, 
Johnson and Robinson, 2001; Hall and Jones, 1999). Furthermore, following the likes 
of Rodrik et al (2004), distance from the equator has been chosen as the second 
instrument for openness/trade policy variables.
Our Instrumental Variable (IV) Regression (or 2 Stage Least Square) model has two 
equations
……………(5)iiii HKOPENTHEIL 1 
……………(6)iiii DisteqFROPEN 2 
Here  stands for predicted trade shares from gravity equations computed by iFR
Frankel and Romer (1999).
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In the 1st stage, equation (6) has been used to generate predicted values of 
openness/ trade policy variables by regressing them on the two instruments. The 
predicted openness/trade policy variables are then employed in equation (5) as the 
second and final stage of IV regression analysis. Please note that the only difference 
between eq (5) and equation (4) is that the former does not carry   variable iDisteq
which is instead used as an instrument in eq (6). 
Before we carry out the IV analysis, let us look at simple bivariate graphs between 
predicted trade shares and predicted tariff rates with Theil index to see whether this 
time we can get a clearer picture regarding openness inequality relationship. Figure 
3 visibly shows that inequality moves positively with openness. The predicted values 
of openness/trade policy provide a much clear trends in openness-inequality 
movements. On the one hand the first graph of figure 3 shows that increase in trade 
shares after liberalization leads to higher inequality and on the other hand the 
second graph suggests that decrease in tariffs carries unequal distributional effects 
on wages. One of the reasons for decrease in relative wages of unskilled labor, as 
tariffs fall, is that the heavily protected sectors in many developing countries tend to 
be the sectors that employ a high proportion of unskilled workers (Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2004). 
Figure 3
 Openness (Predicted values of ‘Exports+Imports/GDP’, 1985), Tariffs (Predicted values of ‘Import Duties as a % Imports’, 1985) 
and Wage Inequality (Theil Index, 1997)
10
Table 2 (Appendix 1) gives IV regression results with 58 different specifications. The 
results confirm the findings of figure 3. All openness/ trade policy variables carry 
expected signs and nearly all of them are significantly related with wage inequality. 
Under the light of these results it can be safely suggested that trade liberalization 
significantly worsens the distribution of wages among skilled and unskilled labor in 
developing countries. Further more, human capital is negatively related to inequality 
showing that the countries which start out with relatively developed human capital 
do well apropos wage inequality. This is an expected result and in line with theory 
that the countries, where human capital is evenly distributed, are less prone to 
adverse wage distributions among labor (Fisher, 2001; Tuelings and Van Rens, 2002; 
Eiche, 2001; and Bourguignon and Morrisson, 1990; Tilak, 1989). 
3. Human Capital, Trade and Unequal Wages:
According to Tinbergen (1975) inequality is determined by the opposing effects that 
technology (skilled labor demand) and education (skilled labor supply) exerted on 
the relative wages. Following the line proposed by Tinbergen, the role of human 
capital vis-à-vis inequality becomes complex once we bring trade liberalization into 
the picture as trade effects the demand of skilled labor through technology transfer 
and processes of learning by doing. For example, human capital under liberalization 
can cause wage inequality in a developing country, where there is unequal 
distribution of skilled and unskilled labor, because global integration cause upward 
pressure on the wages of the skilled labor as demand of skilled labor exceeds its 
supply 
Recently, Eiche et al (2001: 19) accepted this fact and suggested that human capital 
plays a dual role in development because the stock of educated workers in an 
economy determine both the degree of income inequality and the rate of growth, 
and  the parameters of the demand for and supply of labor are crucial determinants 
of whether inequality increases or decreases as an economy accumulates human 
capital. Arbache et al (2004) also confirms this assertion as they found out that 
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imported technology has raised the relative demand for highly skilled labor in Brazil 
and thus lowered the wages of low level education groups. 
Figure 4, below shows that trade liberalization improves human capital in developing 
countries. This is true because as explained above, increased international trade is 
followed by technology transfer which in turn improves the general skill level in a 
developing country as learning by doing takes place and skilled labor supply tries to 
adjust with its excess demand. This means that part of human capital is endogenous 
to the processes of openness as hinted by many endogenous growth models. Here 
the part of skilled human capital which is endogenous to integration will have its 
own effect on relative wages and inequality. And this effect is expected to be 
different from the one which is attributed to the initial human capital endowments 
in a country. 
Figure 4
    
-
       Openness (Predicted values of ‘Exports+Imports/GDP’, 1985) and HK.
We know from above discussion that wage inequality in many developing countries 
has deteriorated amid more international trade. In order to know whether human 
capital accumulation, which is directly accrued through processes of trade, is guilty 
of aggravating wage inequality in developing countries, the paper generates 
predicted values of human capital by regressing them on FR (1999) predicted trade 
shares. Figure 5 shows two graphs. First one illustrates a simple relation ship 
between human capital and wage inequality and suggests that countries with better 
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human capital do well apropos inequality. The second graph, where we predicted 
human capital on FR trade shares, follows the opposite line and confirms that human 
capital accumulation which is owed to global integration, carry augmented effects on 
wage inequality. Now this leads to another question as to why would human capital 
under liberalized trade work against wage equality in developing countries? The 
answer is simple. Generally in most developing countries human capital is unevenly 
distributed (Ravallion, 2003). Thomas, Wang and Fan (2000) and Domenech and 
Castello (2002) have found out that Gini coefficient of the distribution of human 
capital in Sub Saharan Africa and South Asia respectively, is the highest in the world. 
Berthelemy (2004) came up with the same conclusion not only for Sub Saharan 
Africa and South Asia but also for Middle East and North Africa (MENA). According to 
Berthelemy (2004), the unequal distribution of income in these regions are due to 
inequitable education policies of their respective governments who pay on average 
much more attention to secondary and tertiary education than primary education.
Figure 5
                            
One of the reasons for this biasness in education policies in these developing 
countries towards higher education is the fact that elementary education has a very 
limited direct role in determining growth rates. According to Barro (1999) the rate of 
economic growth responds more to secondary or higher education levels rather than 
elementary schooling. This is true because processes of growth are deeply linked 
with higher education instead of primary education. For example, in developing 
countries international trade, which is one of the key determinants of growth, favors 
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either highly qualified university graduates or those who have at least finished their 
high school. The sole reason that India and China have been the haven for 
international outsourcing and trade in contemporary times is because they have 
managed to accumulate relatively educated and skilled human capital by investing 
on higher education. It is expected that over the next five years, 3.3 million services 
and industry jobs and $ 136 billion in wages will be outsourced only from United 
States, while most of them finding their way to the Indian or Chinese Shores. Only in 
India, on any given day in New Delhi, Bombay and Bangalore, the call goes for a new 
call center recruits who are sufficiently educated to communicate in English and 
have at least acquired a high school diploma. At least, as far as international trade is 
concerned, it is quite evident that the Southern countries which are benefiting today 
and which will benefit the most in near future are those who have transformed a 
portion of their labor force into relatively skilled intensive by investing generously on 
its higher education programs. Well, these countries are also the ones which have 
been the fastest growing economies of recent times.
So it is no surprise that in order to be competitive in a race to the top, developing 
countries generally have a tendency to invest in higher education at the cost of 
primary education to achieve greater growth. Recently, Pakistan has also fallen for 
this trap as its current education policy is skewed towards higher education, whereas 
primary education is being overlooked. Only last year the government increased its 
higher education budget to Rs 5 billion from a meager amount of Rs 800 million five 
years ago - an increase of nearly 400 percent. For this year the government has 
allocated double the amount of last year for higher education. Such a focus on 
higher education is unprecedented in the history of this country. However allocation 
of funds to primary education is in contrast with such heavy investments in higher 
education since the budget for primary education has been increased by a meager 
average of 4 percent for the last few years. Though, in coming years Pakistan will 
definitely reap the fruits of its higher education focus and compete with other 
developing countries in international markets for its cheap and skilled human capital, 
it should also get ready for increased distortions in domestic labor markets as the 
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relative wages of unskilled labor would decline amid increased international trade. 
This apparent pro growth higher education policy of Pakistan at the cost of primary 
education may very well be good for income generation but it definitely excludes the 
poor and unskilled and will subsequently lead to increased wage and income 
inequalities in the country. 
In order to show how income inequalities increase with education inequality 
Gregorio and Lee (1999) worked with a traditional model of human capital where the 
level of earnings (Y) is accrued by an individual with S years of schooling: 
……………………………………(9)


s
j
jos urYY
1
)1log(loglog
where is the rate of return to the jth year of schooling. The function can be jr
approximated by:
……………………………………………….(10).loglog urSYY os 
Whereas the distribution of earnings can be written as:
……….(11)).,(2)()()()(log
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 A sharp rise in educational inequalities Var(S) would unambiguously lead to higher 
wage inequality in equation (11) if other variables are held constant. On the same 
account, rise in wage inequality is a clear outcome if Var(r) is high. Here we know 
that returns to higher education are greater than returns to primary education in 
developing countries because of excess demand of skilled labor as rapid technology 
diffusion amid trade liberalization takes place and skilled labor supply lags behind. 
However, equation (11) also suggests that under the assumption of other things as 
constant, if the covariance between the return to education and the level of 
education is negative, an increase in schooling can reduce wage inequality. Well 
there is some empirical evidence that there is a negative relationship between the 
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return to education and average years of schooling (Teulings and Van Rens, 2002). 
The negative value of Cov (r, S) suggest that as the relative supply of high skilled 
workers go up and that of unskilled workers go down, the relative wages of skilled 
labor decreases. Though Cov(r, S) gives some useful information apropos wage 
inequality, the information can very well be misleading because movements in 
relative wages are as much a function of ‘skilled labor demand’ as it is of skilled labor 
supply. For example, through trade liberalization, there is a constant transfer of 
technology in developing countries which increase the demand for skilled labor as 
learning by doing takes place. If this increased demand for skilled labor is more than 
its supply, there is a good possibility that wages of skilled labor rise instead of 
plummeting. And if the wages of unskilled labor fail to rise simultaneously because 
unskilled labor are in excess supply in developing countries, the wage inequality will 
very well increase and the negative relationship between level of schooling and 
returns to education Cov (r, S) might not hold at all. This fact is recognized by Dur 
and Tuelings( 2002) when they admitted that in the Tinbergen’s (1975) famous race 
between technology (skilled labor demand) and education (skilled labor supply), 
technology has been a clear winner of recent times. 
In short the key to equality of relative wages in developing countries do not lie as 
much in Cov (r, S) but in the value of Var(S). Our discussion suggests that the 
inequalities, which we witness today in developing countries, have two important 
determinants. First there are significant inequalities in educational attainments. 
Second, the processes of international trade transform these education inequalities 
into wage inequalities by favoring the skilled labor. 
Well to this effect, in order to solve for wage inequality in developing countries, the 
respective governments need to increase the mean level of human capital through a 
balanced education policy whereby primary education is given as much importance 
as higher education. An equitable education policy will not only decrease Var(S), it 
will also lead to a negative value of Cov(r, S) as the overall supply of low skilled and 
uneducated workers go down and supply of educated work force increases. Dur and 
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Tuelings (2002) have called for subsidies to all levels of education as they argue that 
the mean level of education gives rise to general equilibrium effects that reduce 
wage inequality. 
4. CONCLUSIONS:
The paper has found out that contrary to the claims of neo-classical paradigm, 
openness does have significant effects on wage inequality. The empirical evidence 
provided in the paper supports the argument that international trade is biased 
towards skilled workers in developing countries and with an increase of trade after 
liberalization, the wages of skilled workers are most likely to increase in South, 
where as poor who are largely unskilled shall increasingly become the hostage of 
such process. 
This conclusion has some serious implications for the success of poverty reduction 
strategies in developing countries because inequality is one of the two channels 
through which poverty is affected. The newly adopted common wisdom that growth 
always trickles down to decrease poverty if supplemented by certain relevant 
development strategies e.g. micro finance schemes etc may be true but ignoring the 
inequality part vis-a-vis poverty is a fatal mistake especially when pro poor growth 
policies e.g. liberalization or opening up leads to increases in the formal variable 
(inequality). The general perception among the right that inequality is never that 
significant to offset pro poor growth effects is not true and has to be re-evaluated 
also. 
Recently, the World Bank has accepted this fact since its webpage4 on “Poverty” 
advices policy makers that poverty reduction and social development cannot be 
achieved by focusing on growth strategies with out any understanding of their 
effects on the distribution of income and wealth: “The benefits of growth for the 
poor may be eroded if the distribution of income worsens. But policies that promote 
4 Web address: http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/mission/rp1.htm
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better income distribution are not well understood; learning more about the impact 
of policies on distribution should be high on the agenda”
All in all, it is apposite to conclude that more and more people might be able to live 
above poverty line with increases in growth attributed to the so-called reform 
process - thus showing some improvements regarding extreme poverty, but if 
inequality is on rise more and more people are worse off and an increase of the gap 
between have and have nots can not be defended with any academic jargon and is 
definite welfare loss. Thus it becomes all more important to understand inequality 
and its determinants. If free trade is guilty of increasing inequality among people or 
societies, the process has to be sterilized against such a phenomenon.  
The paper makes some suggestions to this effect. It tries to find those channels 
through which liberalization causes wage inequality. In line with previous studies we 
have found out that education is the key to explain the increasing gap in relative 
wages. Though the paper supports the argument that those countries which starts 
out with higher level of human capital do well on inequality front, it also suggests 
that human capital which is accrued through the liberalization process is guilty of 
unequal distribution of wages among skilled and unskilled labor. One explanation is 
that governments in the developing countries invest in higher education at the cost 
of primary education in order to accrue quicker benefits from processes of growth 
and thus become prone to wage inequality after trade liberalisation. 
The paper carries very important guide lines for policy makers. In order to neutralize 
the unequal effects of trade, the focus of policy makers should be on education. The 
countries, which have greater frequency of educated people, are in a better position 
to benefit from international trade. However there is a caveat. Generally the 
governments in developing countries tend to focus their education policy on higher 
education in the anticipation that investments in higher education would accrue 
faster dividends by exploiting the international business environment. Though they 
are right, they need to realize that they should not promote higher education at the 
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cost of primary education. Since literature suggests that many developing countries 
are guilty of promoting higher education at the cost of primary education, only a 
limited segment of the society participates in activities emanating from international 
trade, whereas the majority which is excluded is also be barred from the benefits of 
growth and its processes (i.e., trade) at least in the short term. The cases in point are 
China and India who have been the most prominent beneficiaries of international 
trade. Though, both the countries are able to achieve high growth rates as their 
relatively skilled and cheaper human capital ( a direct outcome of their higher 
education focus) has utilized the recent surge of international outsourcing by 
multinationals, they have suffered from increasing inequality because large portions 
of the population are left out because they were illiterate and unskilled. 
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Table 1a: OLS Regression Results with different Specifications^
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Table 1b: OLS Regression Results with different Specifications^
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23
hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.003                -0.003
(-0.54)               (-0.71)
-0.0003                                      -0.001
(-0.34)                                       (-0.77)
57                           57                   70                  70
0.01                       0.01                0.009              0.05
hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.005             -0.006
(-1.00)             (-1.2)
-0.0003                                 -0.0004 
(-0.37)                                     (-0.5)
 55                       55                  70                  70
0.05                     0.05              0.05               0.05
Tars2a
hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.002               -0.001           -0.0007             -0.0005
(-1.3)                (-1.14)             (-0.8)               (-0.62)
-0.002               -0.003           -0.0008        
(-0.47)              (-0.77)             (-0.9)
-0.0008        
(-0.8)
 57                        57                  70                      70
0.04                     0.04                0.02                 0.005
totgva
hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.0008          -0.0009           -0.001            -0.001
(-1.8)***       (-1.91)***      (-2.4)**        (2.38)**
-0.006             -0.006             
(-1.16)            (-1.31)
-0.0003                                 -0.0006 
(-0.39)                                  (-0.66)
55                       55                   70                70
0.08                   0.07               0.08            0.076
Tars2r
Hk
disteq
  n
2R
0.0017                0.0017             0.0002           0.0002
(3.8)*                  (3.9)*              (1.19)            (1.13)
-0.008                 -0.008
(-1.9)***             (-1.9)***
0.0003                                         -0.0007
(0.34)                                           (-0.86)
57                           57                    70                  70
0.228                     0.227                0.029          0.018
totgvr
hk
disteq
  
n
2R
-0.0002           -0.003           -0.0005          -0.0006
(-0.48)            (-0.52)           (-1.02)            (-1.04)
-0.004            -0.0045          
(-0.74)           (-0.91)          
-0.0005                                 -0.0006
(-0.55)                                   (-0.65)
55                      55                    70                 70
0.02                0.018                0.022            0.015
tariffs
Hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.0015              -0.0015         -0.0006            -0.0007
(-1.2)                   (-1.2)             (-0.4)                (-0.5)
-0.008                 -0.008            
(-1.5)                   (-1.6)
-0.0001                                      0.0003
(-0.1)                                          (0.4)
59                          59                    82                    82
0.05                       0.05               0.005              0.003
owqi
Hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.038             -0.04            -0.049               -0.052
(-1.03)             (-1.1)            (-1.4)                 (-1.5)
-0.005             -0.005        
(-1.1)               (-1.2)          
-0.0002                                -0.0005
(-0.28)                                  (-0.66)
   59                    59                  72                     72
 0.04                  0.04               0.03                  0.02
owti
Hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.053             -0.055               -0.075             -0.077
(-0.9)                (-1.0)               (-1.4)                (-1.4)
-0.005             -0.005        
(-1.13)              (-1.2)          
-0.0003                                   -0.0006
(-1.13)                                      (-0.8)
59                      59                      72                    72
0.04                   0.03                 0.03                0.027
nontaro
Hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.0003         -0.0003         -0.0003            -0.0003
(-0.8)             (-0.9)             (-1.1)               (-1.05)
-0.004            -0.005
(-0.9)              (-1.1)
-0.0004                               -0.0007
(-0.5)                                    (-0.7)
  55                    55                  70                      70
 0.03                 0.03               0.02                  0.01
txtrg
hk
disteq
  n
2R
0.096                0.089               0.19                0.165
(0.19)              (0.18)              (0.48)              (0.43)
-0.002              -0.002        
(-0.26)             (-0.29)
0.0006                                    0.0005
(0.51)                                     (0.54)
40                         40                46                     36
0.01                    0.006             0.01                 0.005
nontarm
hk
disteq
  n
2R
-0.0002          -0.0002            -0.0002        -0.0002
(-0.68)             (-0.76)             (-0.89)         (-0.88)
-0.0004           -0.005            
(-0.49)             (-1.02)
-0.004                                     -0.0006
(-0.49)                                      (-0.7)
55                       55                     70                 70
0.03                   0.024               0.018            0.011
totgvo
hk
disteq
 
 n
2R
-0.0006           -0.0006             -0.0009           -0.0009
(-1.3)               (-1.42)              (-1.8)**          (-1.94)
-0.005            -0.0058     
(-1.0)                (-1.15)
-0.0003                                  -0.0005
(-0.37)                                     (-0.53)
  55                        55                  70                   70
 0.05                     0.05               0.05                0.05
nontara
hk
disteq
 
 n
2R
-0.0002           -0.0002         -0.0003          -0.0003
(-0.8)               (-0.85)           (-1.09)           (-1.06)
-0.004              -0.005           
(-0.8)               (-1.03)           
-0.0005                                  -0.0007
(-0.5)                                       (-0.74)
55                       55                   70                  70
0.03                  0.027                0.024            0.016
-*, ** and *** denotes 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. ^ For variable descriptions please refer to appendix 1.
Table  2a: IV Regression Results With Different Specifications^:
    1       2 1 2 1 2
lcopen 0.037 0.027 impen2m 0.002 0.003 tars1r 0.003 0.004
24
(2.25)* (1.14) (1.7)** (2.2)* (2.4)* (2.8)*
hk -0.008 hk -0.007 hk -0.009
(-2.12)* (1.4) (-2.14)*
F-test 3.5* 1.3 F-test 1.8 4.9* F-test 3.4* 8.2*
 n  70 100  n 58  72  n 59 73
2R  0.11 0.04 2R _ _ 2R 0.30 0.23
impen1o 0.0014 0.002 impen2a 0.007 0.01 tars2o 0.001 0.0004
(2.0)* (2.2)* (1.7)** (2.1)* (1.7)* (1.5)
hk -0.008 hk -0.006 hk -0.008
(-1.65)** (-1.2) (-1.6)
F-test 2.3** 5.1* F-test 1.7 4.5* F-test 1.8 2.2
 n 59 73  n 58 72  n 57 70
2R _ _ 2R _ _ 2R _ _
impen1m 0.002 0.003 impen2r 0.003 0.005 tars2m 0.001 0.001
(2.1)* (2.3)* (1.9)** (2.2)* (1.6) (1.5)
hk -0.009 hk -0.008 hk -0.009
(-1.7)** (-1.7)** (-1.5)
F-test 2.4** 4.9* F-test 2.2 4.5* F-test 1.6 2.4
 n 59 73  n 58 72  n 57 70
2R _ _ 2R  0.1 _ 2R _ _
impen1a 0.007 0.01 tars1o 0.001 0.0012 tars2a 0.003 0.003
(1.91)** (2.2)* (2.1)* (2.8)* (1.39) (1.7)**
hk -0.005 hk -0.009 hk -0.004
(-0.9) (-1.8)** (0.87)
F-test 2.2 4.9* F-test 2.5* 6.16* F-test 1.2 2.8**
 N 59 73  n 59 73  n 57 70
2R _ 2R 0.03 _ 2R _ _
impen1r 0.009 0.009 tars1m 0.002 0.002 tars2r 0.002 0.001
(1.7)** (1.9)** (1.9)** (2.1)* (1.96)* (1.2)
hk -0.012 hk -0.012 hk -0.009
(-1.6)** (-1.8)** (1.85)**
F-test 1.7 3.6** F-test 2.09 4.5* F-test 2.3** 1.5
 n 59 73  n 59 73  n 57 70
2R _ 2R _ _ 2R 0.21 _
impen2o 0.001 0.002 tars1a 0.005 0.005 tariffs -0.005 -0.016
(1.8)** (2.3)* (1.7)** (2.1)* (-0.72) (-1.1)
hk -0.007 hk -0.003 hk -0.014
(-1.5) (-0.5) (-1.12)
F-test 1.9 5.1* F-test 1.7 4.31* F-test 0.92 1.38
 n 58 72  n 59 73  n 59 78
2R 0.006 _ 2R _ _ 2R _ _
- * and ** denote significance at 5% and 10% level. ^ For variable descriptions please refer to appendix 1.
Table  2b: IV Regression Results With Different Specifications^:
25
1 2 1 2
owti -0.31 -0.26 totgvr -0.004 -0.004
(-234)* (-1.7)** (-1.7)** (-2.1)*
hk -0.004 hk -0.008
(-1.56) (-1.2)
F-test 3.3* 3.4* F-test 1.7 4.4*
 n 73 109  n 55 70
2R 0.08 0.01 2R _ _
txtrg 3.34 3.05 owqi -0.23 -0.39
(1.40) (1.38) (-0.88) (-1.3)
hk 0.014 hk -0.008
(0.74) (-1.3)
F-test 2.2 3.9 F-test 0.8 1.5
 n 49 66  n 59 72
2R _ _ 2R _ _
totgvo -0.002 -0.002 nontaro -0.002 -0.002
(2.1)** (-2.5)** (-1.6)** (2.1)*
hk -0.009 hk -0.013
(-1.5) (-1.5)
F-test 2.6*** 6.6* F-test 1.6 4.5*
 n 55 70  n 55 70
2R _ _ 2R _ _
totgvm 0.002 -0.002 nontarm -0.002 -0.002
(-2.1)* (-2.6)* (-1.6) (2.02)*
hk -0.009 hk -0.015
(-1.5) (-1.5)
F-test 2.6** 6.6* F-test 1.42 4.1*
 n 55 70  n 55 70
2R _ _ 2R _ _
totgva -0.002 -0.002 nontara -0.003 -0.002
(-2.2)* (-2.6)* (-1.2) (-1.9)**
hk -0.009 hk -0.018
(-1.7)** (-1.3)
F-test 2.7** 6.8* F-test 0.9 3.5**
 n 55 70  n 55 70
2R _ _ 2R _ _
- * and ** denote significance at 5% and 10% level. ^ For variable descriptions please refer to appendix 1.
APPENDIX 2
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  DATA AND SOURCES:
Black: Black Market Premium, Year: 1985. Source: Rose (2002).
Disteq: Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90. Source: Rodrik, 
Subramanian & Trebbi (2002)
heritage: Heritage Foundation Index, Source: Rose (2002).
hk:  Average Schooling Years in the total population at 25,Year: 1999. Source: Barro R & J. W. 
Lee data set, http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html
hyr: Average Years of Higher Schooling in the Total Population at 25, Year: 1999.  
Source: Barro R & J. W. Lee data set, 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html
Impen1o: Import Penetration: overall, 1985.  Source: Rose (2002).
 Impen1m: Import penetration: Manufacturing, 1985. Source: Rose (2002).
Impen1a:  Import Penetration:  Agriculture, 1985. Source: Rose (2002).
Impen1r: Import Penetration: Resources, 1985. Source: Rose (2002).
Impen2o: Import Penetration: overall, 1982. Source: Rose (2002).
Impen2m: Import penetration: Manufacturing, 1982. Source: Rose (2002).
Impen2a: :  Import Penetration:  Agriculture, 1982. Source: Rose (2002).
Impen2r: Import Penetration: Resources, 1982. Source: Rose (2002).
Lcopen: Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nomnal) imports 
plus exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn World Tables, Mark 6.
Logfrankrom: Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following Frankel and 
Romer (1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables. Source: 
Frankel and Romer (1999).
Nontaro: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: Overall, 1987. Source: Rose (2002).
Nontarm: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: manufacturing, 1987. Source: Rose (2002).
Nontara: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: agriculture, 1987. Source: Rose (2002).
Nontarr: Non- Taiff Barriers Coverage: resources, 1987. Source: Rose (2002).
Open80: Sachs and Warners (1995) composite openness index. Source: Rose (2002).
Owqi: Non Trade barriers Frequency on intermediate inputs, Capital goods, 1985. Source: 
Rose (2002).
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Owti:  Tariffs on Intermediate and Capital Goods, 1985. Source: Rose (2002)
Tars1o:  TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002).
Tars1m: TARS Trade Penetration: manufacturing, 1985. Source:  Rose (2002).
Tars1a: TARS Trade Penetration: agriculture, 1985. Source:  Rose (2002).
Tars1r: TARS Trade Penetration: resources, 1985. Source:  Rose (2002).
Tars2o: TARS Trade Penetration: overall, 1982. Source:  Rose (2002).
Tars2m: TARS Trade Penetration: manufacturing, 1982. Source:  Rose (2002).
Tars2a: TARS Trade Penetration: agriculture, 1982. Rose (2002).
Tars2r: TARS Trade Penetration: resourses, 1982. Rose (2002).
Tariffs: Import Duties as percentage imports, Year:1985. Source: World Development 
Indicators (WDI), 2002.
Theil97: UTIP-UNIDO Wage Inequality THEIL Measure - calculated based on UNIDO2001 by 
UTIP, Year: 1997. Source: University of Texas Inequality Project (UTIP) 
http://utip.gov.utexas.edu.
Totgvo:  Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: overall, 1985. Source: Rose (2002)
Totgvm: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: manufacturing, 1985. Source: Rose 
(2002)
Totgva: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: agriculture, 1985. Source: Rose (2002)
Totgvr: Weighted Average of Total Import Charges: resourses, 1985. Source: Rose (2002)
Txtrg: Trade taxes / trade, 1982. Source: rose (2002)
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APPENDIX 3:
LIST OF COUNTRIES
Afghanistan  (1988)              
Albania   (1997)                      
Algeria  (1997)
Angola (1993)                      
Argentina (1996)                   
Armenia (1997)                    
Azerbaijan (1994)                  
Bahamas, The (1990)                       
Bahrain  (1992)                     
Bangladesh (1990)                 
Barbados (1997)                        
Belize (1992)                                
Benin (1981)                         
Bhutan (1989)                       
Bolivia (1997)                        
Bosnia  (1990)                   
Botswana  (1997)                   
Brazil (1994)                      
Bulgaria (1997)                  
Burkina Faso (1981)                       
Burundi (1990)                       
Cameroon (1997)               
Cape Verde (1993)                 
Central African Republic 
(1993)                                Chile 
(1997)                         China  
(1985)                        Colombia  
(1997)
 Congo, Rep. (1988)                 
Costa Rica  (1997)                
Cote d'Ivoire (1997)                    
Croatia  (1994)                          
Cuba (1988)                            
Cyprus (1997)                 
Dominican Republic (1985)
Ecuador (1997)
Egypt,  (1997)                     El 
Salvador (1997)              
Equatorial Guinea    (1990)              
Eritrea (1988)                       
Ethiopia  (1997)                              
Fiji (1997)                                  
Gabon (1994)                       
Gambia, The  (1981)                                               
Ghana   (1995)                   
Guatemala  (1997)                     
Haiti  (1988)                            
Honduras (1994)                     
Hong Kong, China (1997)              
India  (1997)
Indonesia  (1997)                       
Iran, Islamic Rep (1993)                   
Iraq (1985)
Jamaica (1990)                        
Jordan (1997)                
Kenya  (1997)             Korea, 
Rep.  (1997)                      
Kuwait (1997)               
Kyrgyz Republic (1994)                   
Latvia   (1997)                     
Lesotho  (1994)                         
Liberia  (1985)                        
Libya (1980)                           
Lithuania  (1997)         
Macao, China  (1997)               
Macedonia, FYR (1996)      
Madagascar (1988)                
Malawi (1997)                    
Malaysia  (1997)               
Mauritania (1978)                    
Mauritius (1997)
Mexico (1997)                      
Moldova (1994)                      
Mongolia (1994)                       
Morocco (1997)                    
Mozambique (1994)                
Myanmar (1997)                       
Namibia (1994)
Nepal  (1996)                     
Nicaragua (1985)                        
Nigeria (1994)                          
Oman (1997)          
Pakistan  (1996)                    
Panama  (1997)                    
Papua New Guinea 
(1989)                     
Paraguay (1991) 
 Peru (1994)                   
Philippines  (1997)                             
Puerto Rico (1997)                     
Qatar (1994) 
 Romania (1994)                 
Rwanda (1985)                                         
Saudi Arabia (1989)
Senegal (1997)                    
Seychelles (1988)                   
Singapore (1997)              
Slovak Republic 
(1997)
 Slovenia (1997)                    
Somalia (1986)                
South Africa (1997)                                                   
Sri Lanka (1994)                   
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines (1994)                         
Sudan (1972)                      
Suriname (1993)
Swaziland ((1994)
Syria (1997)
Togo (1981)
Thailand (1994)
Tonga (1994)
Trinidad and Tobago 
(1994)
Tunisia (1997)
Turkey (1997)
Taiwan (1997)
Tanzania (1990)
Uganda(1988)
Ukraine (1997)
United Arab Emirates 
(1985)
Ukraine (1997)
Uruguay(1997)
Venezuela (1994)
Western Samoa (1972)
Yemen (1986)
Yoguslavia (1997)
Zambia (1994)
Zimbabwe (1997)
